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the impact of union rep mandates by exploiting legal membership thresholds present in
Portugal: for instance, while firms employing up to 49 union members are required to have
one union rep, this increases to two (three) union reps for firms with 50 to 99 (100-199)
union members. Drawing on matched employer-employee data on the unionised sector
and regression discontinuity methods, we find that a one percentage point increase in the
legal union rep/members ratio leads to an increase in firm performance of at least 7%.
This result holds across multiple dimensions of firm performance and appears to be driven
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1 Introduction
The performance of organisations is generally strongly affected by the people that work in
them. This applies in the case of businesses as well as in the case of trade unions. Employee
representatives, given their dual affiliation as employees of a firm and members of a trade
union or works council, can therefore play critical roles on both organisations. In particular,
union representatives will thus also be key drivers of any potential economic effects of trade
unions upon firms.
In fact, union representatives (also commonly referred to as ‘union delegates’, ‘shop stew-
ards’, or ‘union stewards’, and henceforth simply as ‘union reps’) can be influential, in a
positive or negative way, in multiple business dimensions that affect firm performance, with
ultimately positive or negative effects upon firm performance. These dimensions include
collective bargaining, training, innovation, health and safety, compliance with regulations,
information dissemination, strikes, restructuring and dismissals. Union reps can also poten-
tially contribute towards higher wages, an important policy goal in many countries, given the
evidence of stagnant wages and declining labour shares. This contribution can arise through
the productivity channels above (if their net effects are positive) and or by strengthening the
bargaining power of workers in rent sharing. Indeed, the future of unions will arguably depend
more on their contributions towards rent generation than on their achievements in terms of
rent extraction.
This study contributes to the large literature on unions as the first explicit examination
of the impact of employee representatives.1 In contrast to and complementing the existing
research, in this paper we examine the entirely novel question of the (causal) impact of addi-
tional union reps in firms. Indeed, the quantity and quality of the activities conducted by reps
in firms can depend critically on the number of reps that are not only recognised by the firm
as legitimate representatives of (unionised) workers but also supported in terms of paid time
off work (as an employee) and greater employment protection so that they can conduct the
union activities described above. Importantly, while some of these activities will be directly
aligned with the interests of employers, others will not, at least not in a short-run perspective.
1This literature is surveyed in Doucouliagos et al. (2017), including DiNardo & Lee (2004), Lee & Mas
(2012), Sojourner et al. (2015) and Barth et al. (2017) which present causal evidence of the impact of collective
bargaining mandates for unions in the US and of union density in Norway. See also OECD (2017) for an
international analysis of collective bargaining and social partners and Freeman & Lazear (1994) and Mueller
& Stegmaier (2017) for early and recent studies of works councils.
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Our analysis is based on labour law regulations common in many countries that establish
the number of recognised and supported union reps as a (non-linear) function of the number
of workers in the firm.2 We consider the case of Portugal, in which the (non-linear) legal
function determining the number of union reps is based exclusively on the number of unionised
workers in the firm (and not all workers, unionised or not, as in France and Italy). Specifically,
employers with up to 49 unionised workers are required to support at least one union rep,
a number that increases to two in the case of firms with 50 to 99 unionised workers, three
(100-199), six (200-499) and then one more for each 200 additional unionised workers (Figure
1).
We exploit empirically the legal requirements above using a regression discontinuity ap-
proach, considering the case of multiple cut-offs (see ? for a similar application). Intuitively,
our analysis is based on a comparison of firms within the unionised sector that happen to have
small differences in their numbers of unionised workers around the legal thresholds above (such
as 50, 100, and 200) to tackle the potential endogeneity that would otherwise confound our
estimates. The fact that these thresholds are based on union members and not all workers is
also important. Indeed, this virtually eliminates the possibility that these discontinuities are
picking up the effect of other regulations based on the number of workers of the firm (Martins
2009a, Garicano et al. 2016), that may also establish thresholds at the same levels used for
union reps (except in the very uncommon cases of 100% union density rates). Thresholds
based on union reps also provide for greater stability in the characterisation of firms, in this
case in terms of the number of union reps, given the lower volatility over time in union mem-
bership size compared to workforce size. We then exploit the wide range of variables of our
matched-employee data, covering all firms in the country with unionised workers, to evaluate
the impact of the union reps legal mandates on a large number of firm- and worker-level
outcomes.
Our analysis of all unionised firms allows us to have a representative view of the effects
of unions in firms within a country, rather than focus only on new unions DiNardo & Lee
2For instance, in France both the number of union reps in each firm and per union varies between one and
five depending on the firm size. Moreover, the paid time off work for union activities that each union rep is
entitled also varies depending on firm size, between 12 to 24 hours per month for union activities. (See Breda
(2016) for a detailed description of union representatives in France.) In Italy, the number of union reps starts
at three (firms with 16 to 200 employees), increasing by three more for each 300 additional employees up to
3,000 and then for each 500 additional employees. In contrast, in the UK, there is not a fixed amount of paid
time off determined in law nor a fixed number of union reps per firm. Similar regulations are found in many
other countries with respect to workers’ councils. See CESifo DICE (2015) for more information.
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(2004), Lee & Mas (2012). Our analysis also contrasts to earlier causal studies of the economic
impacts of unions because of our focus on a novel, intensive margin of unionisation (Barth
et al. 2017). In contrast, those studies (DiNardo & Lee 2004, Lee & Mas 2012) focus on an
extensive margin driven by the legal mandate to conduct collective bargaining following a
decision by workers to unionise.
Our results are also in contrast to those studies, as we find that union reps have a sig-
nificantly positive effect on many dimensions of firm performance, including sales, exports,
profits, and survival. This is notwithstanding the costs incurred by firms with union reps,
namely in (paid) time off work and greater employment protection. More specifically, we find
that a one percentage point increase in the ratio between reps and union members translates
into an increase of sales per worker of at least 7%. This effect appears to be driven, at least
in part, by a large increase in the volume of worker training (Dustmann & Schonberg 2009).
On the other hand, we do not find any impact from reps on wages either at the firm- or
at the worker-level, despite their positive productivity effects on the firms where they work.
The latter result can be explained by taking into account the predominance of sectoral-level
collective bargaining and administrative extensions in Portugal (Martins 2014, Hijzen & Mar-
tins 2016), as in several other European countries. In this institutional context, productivity
increases following from the contributions from union reps in firms (as from any other firm-
level or, for that matter, sectoral-level factor) may translate into wage increases for all firms
in the sector, not only the cases of the specific firms where the presence of additional union
reps generate stronger productivity increases.
The structure of the remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the institu-
tional context. Section 3 presents our empirical model and the data used. The main results
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents robustness checks and extensions. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional context
As in other Continental European countries, the Constitution of Portugal establishes that
workers are free to create and join any tyoe of trade unions (article 55). Trade unions are
also considered responsible for the protection and promotion of the rights and interests of
the workers that they represent, in particular through collective bargaining with employers
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(article 56). In this context, the Labour Code of the country establishes a number of norms
regarding the specific rights and responsibilities of trade unions. For instance, the law defines
the union representative (’delegado sindical’) as the worker elected to conduct union activities
in the firm or establishment (article 442).3 The law also determines that each rep is entitled to
spend five to eight paid work hours per month to carry out firm-level union activities (article
467. Moreover, the rep is also entitled to greater protection against dismissals or workplace
reallocation requirements by their employers (articles 410 and 411, respectively).
Critically from the perspective of this paper, the Labour Code also defines the maximum
number of union representatives per firm that are legally entitled to the rights and protection
described above. According to article 463, the number of union reps in the firm varies with
the number of union members in the firm in the following way: one rep in the case of one to
49 union members; two reps in the case of 50 to 99 union members; three reps in the case
of 100 to 199 union members; six reps in the case of 200 to 499 union members; and then
one additional union rep for each additional range of 200 union members (i.e. seven if 500 to
699, eight if 700 to 899, and so on) - see Figure 1 for a graphical presentation. Incidentally,
this norm has been remarkably stable over time, having exactly the same wording since 1975,
when it was first introduced, despite the many labour law reforms since then. Moreover, while
the Labour Code allows collective bargaining to change the numbers above, we know of no
case in which this happened.4 On top of the time allowances for union reps, the Labour Code
(article 468) also establishes time allowances for the trade union board members, again to be
provided by their employers.5
The relationship between union members and union reps can also be examined as a per-
centage (union rep mandates per union member) instead of levels. Figure 2 presents these
regulations from this perspective, which highlights the major jumps in union rep density at
the legal union member thresholds. For instance, in the first threshold (50 union members),
which, as we will see below, is the most relevant from an empirical perspective, this density
3The law also provides some room for workers’ councils to participate in and contribute to social dialogue
in firms but not to conduct (formal) collective bargaining, which may explain the relatively low number of
workers’ councils in the country.
4The same view was expressed by a number of union and employer association leaders with whom we
discussed this matter. We also examined 15 of the main collective agreements in force in the year studied in
this paper and could not find any instance in which this rule was changed.
5These allowances are of four days of work per month. Moreover, the number of board members supported
follows a similar union member schedule as in the main case of union reps but is capped at twelve board
members, in the case of 10,000 or more union members. We do not explore this dimension in this paper, as
our focus is on firm-level effects, while union board members (in contrast to union reps) have a sectoral focus.
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increases from nearly 2% to 4%. In the second threshold (100 union members), the density
increases from 2% to 3%, and in the third (200 members) from 1.5% to 3%, while in the
following thresholds the jumps are negligible. An alternative perspective would be that, in
the first margin (from 49 to 50 union members), there is a 100% increase in unin reps, while in
the second (from 99 to 100 union members), the increase is of only 50%, followed by another
increase of 100% in the third margin (199 to 200 union members).
In terms of labour market background, it is important to add that, as in other (conti-
nental) European countries, collective bargaining coverage in Portugal is high, despite low
and declining levels of union density in the private sector, reaching 11% in 2010. This im-
balance between coverage and density is explained by the widespread extension of sectoral
collective agreements by the Government, so that collective agreements cover all workers, in
particular those that are not members of unions or those that are employed by firms that do
not participate in collective bargaining (Martins 2014, Hijzen & Martins 2016, Addison et al.
2017). Given that labour law, which is applicable to all employees by default, is already fairly
detailed in many if not all dimensions of employment relations (the Labour Code has over 560
articles), the impact of sectoral collective bargaining coverage is largely confined to increas-
ing minimum wages of all occupations in each industry (and, occasionally, regions) over and
above the national minimum wage. On a very small number of cases, collective bargaining is
also conducted at the firm (or holding) level, through specific firms of collective agreements
or informally, to top-up further the working conditions established in the relevant sectoral
agreement. Both types of agreements can be interpreted as a form of rent sharing.6
Finally, and specifically with regards to trade unions, Portugal is characterised by two main
union confederations (CGTP and UGT) and a smaller group of non-affiliated (independent)
unions. For historical and political reasons, the two confederations typically do not work
together. For instance, it is not uncommon that there are two collective agreements, in the
same sector, with virtually the same content (including minimum wage tables) but that were
bargained separately by a given employer association with the two trade unions present in the
sector (each affiliated to a different confederation). In this context, union reps in firms will be
members of trade unions that are affiliated with one of the two confederations (or the third,
6See Martins (2009b) for evidence of rent sharing in a sample of large firms and Addison et al. (2015) for
an analysis of the effects of unions upon wages, in both cases based on the same data for Portugal that is used
in this paper. See also Breda (2015) for an analysis of the effects of unions upon wages in the case of France.
An additional question, which we do not address here, concerns the incentives to become a union member in
a context of widespread extensions.
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independent movement). Workers in each firm may be affiliated to a single trade union or,
particularly in large firms, different workers may be affiliated to different trade unions. In the
latter cases, union reps will be selected from each trade union on a proportional basis (unlike
in the case of France, for instance).
At the level of the firm, union reps will typically be involved in a wide range of activities,
including training, health and safety, compliance with regulations, information dissemination,
strikes, restructuring and dismissals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that union reps will, in
general, be older male workers, with open-ended contracts and long tenure levels in their firm,
in intermediate job levels. These profiles may facilitate the collection and dissemination of
information between employers or senior managers and all employees in the firm, with a view
to the implementation of specific policies in the areas above. As to collective bargaining,
the involvement of union reps may occur on a more direct level in the case of firm-level (or
holding) collective agreements, which is however less empirically relevant, or more indirectly,
in terms of inputs provided to the board members of their trade union when conducting
sectoral collective bargaining.
3 Empirical model and data
Our empirical analysis of the impact of union rep mandates is based on the ‘Quadros de
Pessoal’ (Personnel Records) data set, a comprehensive matched employer-employee panel
collected by the Ministry of Employment. This data set provides detailed annual information
on all private-sector firms based in Portugal that employ at least one worker and also on
all their employees, including time-invariant firm and person identifiers. Worker information
concerns the month of October of each year and includes gender, date of birth, date of entry in
the firm, schooling, occupation, wages, hours of work, type of employment contract, collective
agreement, etc. Firm information includes the industry (five-digit variable), geographical
location, total sales, legal type of firm, capital equity, type of ownership, and total training
hours. We also merged firm-level information on the total annual value of exports from a
different data set, collected by the National Statistics Agency (INE).
Critically for the purposes of our paper, the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data set includes infor-
mation on the number of unionised workers in each firm in the year of 2010, the year in which
we focus our analysis. The availability of this variable, reported by firms, is related to the
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fact that it is common for firms to be responsible for the collection of union dues from the
wages paid to workers which firms then transfer to trade unions. Firms also need to know
the number of union members amongst their employees to be able to recognise and support
the required number of union reps, given the legal context described in Section 2. Although
the data set does not make available information on the actual number of union reps in each
firm, we believe that it is highly likely that the number of reps in each firm will correspond
exactly to the number that follows from the law. On the one hand, unions will want to have
as many reps as possible given the law; on the other hand, firms will want to have as few reps
as possible, again given the law. The solution to these two equations should imply that the
actual number of union reps is exactly the one established by law and described above.7
Given this institutional context, we adopt an intention-to-treat approach in our empirical
analysis that is similar to some US studies DiNardo & Lee (2004), Lee & Mas (2012). How-
ever, as indicated before and in contrast to these studies, we do not examine the extensive
margin following from the legal mandate that requires employers to recognise unions and then
potentially conduct collective bargaining. Instead, we consider the intensive margin related
to the legal mandate that requires employers to increase the number of reps that they recog-
nise and support in their firms. As in the case of the US studies, our analysis is based on a
regression discontinuity approach (Hahn et al. 2001, Lee & Lemieux 2010), but adjusted for
the fact that, in our context, firms are exposed to multiple cut-offs or thresholds (50, 100,
200 and more trade union members), rather than only one (e.g. of a voting share in favour of
unionisation of 50% or above, as in the US studies mentioned).
Moreover, as we are focused on the intensive margin of unions, we consider exclude from
the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data all firms that do not employ any union member in 2010. Given
the low union density rate in Portugal and the over-representation of unionised workplaces
in large firms, this exclusion criterion eliminates 96% of the original number of firms and
64% of the total number of workers and allows us to focus entirely on the intensive margin
of employee representation. Together with our subsequent exclusion of the remaining very
small firms (defined as those with fewer than ten employees) and those with missing values in
key variables, we obtain a sample of 6,489 firms, which correspond to 35% of the workforce.
This sample is described in Table 1, where we find that, on average, these firms employ 125
7We focus exclusively on the firm-level dimension and not the establishment or workplace as we do not have
performance nor union membership information at the latter dimensions.
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workers, of which 27 are union members, and exhibit a union density rate of 28%.
Given our particular context, we implement a different form of a normalise-and-pool re-
gression discontinuity strategy, in which the different thresholds are recentered, the running
variables correspondingly normalised and the resulting observations pooled for a single re-
gression discontinuity analysis (Cattaneo et al. 2016). Instead, we define multiple treated
union membership ranges that correspond to the values between each threshold and half of
the distance until the next threshold. The outcomes of interest then follow from the contrast
between these critical membership ranges (where firms are mandated to increase the number
of union reps) and the membership ranges immediately to the left (where the mandate es-
tablishes a smaller number of union reps), while controlling for a polynomial of the running
variable (the number of union reps).
More specifically, in our benchmark specification, we estimate the following equation:
Yi = α+ βAdditionali + λS(Zi) + i, (1)
in which Yi is an outcome of interest (such as different measures of the performance of
firm i, in particular the log of the ratio of firm sales in 2010 by the number of workers in
that year). Moreover, Additionali is a dummy variable equal to one for firms whose number
of union members is regarded to be immediately after the trade union member thresholds
of article 463 (50-74, 100-149, 200-249, 500-599, 700-799, 900-999 and 1,100-1,199 unionised
workers). As explained above, these ranges were selected so that the first value corresponds
to the union membership threshold itself (when the increase in the number of union reps is
introduced by law) and the last value of the range is a figure halfway (or nearly halfway)
between each pair of thresholds. Finally, S(Zi) is a polynomial and or non-linear function of
the number of union members in the firm, such as a cubic plus a number of dummy variables
capturing the range of union members in the firm (1-74, 75-149, 150-249, 250-599, 600-799,
800-999 and 1,000-1,199 unionised workers), picking up other differences that do not arise at
the critical union rep thresholds. These differences will include the role of firm size, which is
strongly correlated with the number of union members and also with firm performance itself.
Moreover, the latter dummy variables (1-74, 75-149, 150-249, etc) center the analysis at what
may be regarded as the relevant union membership ranges for evaluation purposes.
This flexible setup allows the data to express any differences (in firm performance or
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other variables) stemming from the key dummy variable (Additionali) that indicates union
membership sub-ranges that imply one (or more) additional union reps.8 In this context,
the estimate of the parameter of interest (β) will indicate the average change in the outcome
considered following from firms that happen to have a slightly higher number of union members
at the relevant range of interest and are therefore mandated to recognise and support a higher
number of union reps.
We also consider an alternative, more flexible model, in which we allow for different effects
stemming from different union membership ranges that are associated to different numbers of
union reps, in contrast to the average effect perspective from equation 1:
Yi = α+ β1Membership(50, 99)i + β2Membership(100, 199)i+
+β3Membership(200, 499)i + λS(Zi) + i,
(2)
in which Yi is again the outcome of interest and Membership(50−99)i is a dummy variable
equal to one if firms employ 50 to 99 union members and zero otherwise (and similarly for
the following two variables). As before, S(Zi) is a polynomial and or non-linear function of
the number of union members in the firm. In this context, and in a sample considering only
firms with union members up to 499, the estimate of β1, for instance, will indicate the average
difference in the outcome considered between firms employing 50 to 99 union members with
respect to the comparison group of firms with between one and 49 union members (and thus
only one union rep). Similarly, the difference between the estimates of β2 and β1 will indicate
the marginal effect of one additional union rep as firms employ 100 to 199 union members;
while the difference between the estimates of β3 and β2 will indicate the marginal effect of
three additional union reps as firms have 200 to 499 union members.
The validity of a regression-discontinuity analysis as in the cases of the two equations
above depends on a number of assumptions, in particular regarding potential manipulation
in the number of observations around the thresholds and differences in the values of pre-
determined variables also around the same thresholds. To address the first point, we compute
the distribution of the number of union members across the firms in our sample, presented in
Figure 3, using bins of five workers. We find no evidence of manipulation, as in the case of a
8As discussed before, all thresholds are associated to a one-rep increase except the 200-threshold, which
leads to a three-rep increase. In union-rep density terms, the first three thresholds entail increases of between
one and two percentage points.
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slump in the number of firms immediately to the left of the thresholds and a spike to the right
(or the opposite). The former situation could arise in the case in which unions would seek to
increase their membership in firms where their number of members is just below the relevant
threshold. The latter could be the case when employers seek to dissuade a number of workers
from being union members so that the firm would no longer be above the legal threshold and
therefore save on the resulting costs in union rep time off.
Incidentally, Figure 3 also highlights the rapidly diminishing number of firms as one con-
siders higher numbers of union members. Furthermore, this Figure indicates that most of
any impact that our study may document will come from the threshold at 50 union members
and, significantly less so, at 100 and 200 union members. These are also the thresholds at
which the percentage increases in union-rep density are highest, as exhibited in Figure 2. This
predictable concentration of firms at low sizes is consistent with the descriptive statistics in
Table 1, as the average of our key regressor, Additionali is 7%, four percentage points of
which come from the 75-149 union membership range (and two from the 150-349 range).
In the case of the second validity concern, about differences in pre-determined variables
at the union membership thresholds, we adapt equation 1 and use as dependent variables a
total of 58 predetermined, in most cases time-invariant variables, indicating the industry of
the firm, its age range, its geographical location, its legal type and two additional dummy
variables, regarding foreign ownership and employer association membership. We find that,
out of the 58 variables, and considering a 5% (10%) level, there are significant differences at
the union member thresholds in six (ten) dimensions, which is only slightly higher than in the
case of strictly independent observations. We interpret these results as supportive of a good
balancing in observables. Overall, these results imply that any differences in our outcome
variables are not explained by different characteristics of the firms other than the mandate
towards a higher number of union reps. In any case, we also present below a number of
robustness checks in which we add these and other variables as additional regressors.
A selection of these predetermined variables are presented in Table 1, where we find that
Manufacturing is the main industry in our sample (32% of all firms), followed by Retail and
Wholesale, and Health and Social Support. Firms in our sample are also relatively mature,
as the majority (43%) is between 20 and 49 years old. The main region is that of Porto (30%
of firms), where manufacturing also tends to be prevalent.
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4 Results
Table 2 presents our estimates of equation 1, using the log of sales per worker (in 2010) as
our dependent variable, considering three different polynomials (linar, quadratic and cubic) of
the number of unionised workers in the firm, and including industry fixed effects. The latter
are added as firm performance tends to be highly heterogeneous across industries but we also
investigate the robustness of our results with respect to a more parcimonious specification.
We find that, in all polynomial models, the range of unionised workers immediately after
the thresholds established by law (which mandate firms to recognise and support one or
more additional union reps) is positively and significantly associated with higher levels of
performance. The magnitude of the effects is particularly stable across polynomials, ranging
between 0.132 and 0.157 log points, translating into a percentage increase in firm performance
associated to union reps of between 14% and 17%. Dividing these figures by the most relevant
increase in union rep density, which occurs at the first threshold (50 union members), of two
percentage points, we conclude from this first set of findings that union reps tend to increase
firm performance by at least 7%.
We now turn to our estimates of equation 2, in which we allow for different effects of
union members at different thresholds, rather than impose a single effect. In this model we
also focus on the most relevant union membership range, up to 500, in contrast to the analysis
above, that considers a range up to 1200 union members (but with limited loss in observations,
given the very small number of firms in the largest categories of union membership). Table 3
presents the results, in which we find marginal effects of the first increase of union reps (at 50)
of 0.175, .186 and 0.192 log points, in increasing order of the polynomial of union membership
adopted.
The marginal effects at the next threshold (at 100 union members) drop, to 0.063, 0.07
and .145 (these are the differences between the coefficients of the 100-200 membership range
from the coefficients of the 50-100 membership range), but remain statistically significant at
the 10% level in all cases. Finally, we find that the marginal effects associated to the third
union membership level (200-499 members), corresponding to a jump from three to six union
reps, are .12, .109 and .268, in all cases significant at the 10% level. This U-shaped pattern in
marginal effects at the thresholds mirrors closely the magnitudes of the changes in the union
rep densities, of two, one and 1.5 percentage points (2% to 4%, 2% to 3%, and 1.5% to 3%; or
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100%, 50% and 100% increases in the total number of union reps), respectively, as presented
in Figure 2 and discussed in Section 2. We interpret this close correspondence between the
magnitudes of the marginal effects and of the changes in union density as important additional
evidence of causality. Moreover, dividing these marginal effects by the percentage changes in
union rep density at the thresholds, we find again positive impacts on firm performance of at
least 7% per percentage point of union rep density, highlighting the robustness of the results,
which we investigate further below.
4.1 Robustness
We now turn our attention to additional checks of the resilience of our main findings. Table
4 presents the results from a number of additional specifications. First, Panel A is concerned
with the role of different sets of control variables: the first column drops industry controls, the
second considers instead two-digit (rather than five-digit) industry controls, the third includes
collective-bargaining level industry controls, and the fourth considers a large set of control
variables on top of industries, such as regions, firm legal type, firm age and foreign ownership
status.
We find very similar coefficients across the four specifications, in all cases statistically
significant at the 5% or 10% levels (the latter only when excluding all controls, other than
the union membership linear effect). Moreover, the coefficients are very similar to those of
the benchmark specification presented in Table 2, at 0.157, ranging between 0.128 and 0.16.
While the polynomial specification considered here is the linear one, the same qualitative
results (available upon request) are found when considering the quadratic and cubic models.
Panel B of Table 4 presents further robustness checks, in this case based again on equation
2 but dropping the union member range dummy variables used before, i.e. that separately
indicate firms just below and above the legal thresholds (1-74, 75-149, 150-249, 250-599, 600-
799, 800-999 and 1,000-1,199 unionised workers). In other words, this specification relies
exclusively on the polynomials of the union membership number to control for differences
between firms. We find that, even these very parsimonious specifications also generate very
similar results regarding the impact of the mandates towards additional union reps in firms.
In this case, the coefficients range between 0.088 and 0.146 and are always significant, at least
at the 10% level. Finally, Panel C adopts again the benchmark specification as in Table 2
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except that it does not adjust for any clustering. We find that all coefficients are significant
at the 5% level.
In addition, we conduct a number of falsification exercises. Our motivation is that our
measures of the union rep mandates may be picking up the role of other variables, even if these
are unknown to us, that may happen to coincide or be strongly correlated with the relevant
thresholds. In particular, it may be that differences in the definition of these thresholds also
lead to firm performance effects, a result that would cast doubts on the causal interpretation
of our findings. We address this possibility but considering alternative threshold variables,
defined at similar but different ranges of the union membership variables. Specifically, we
push the threshold rightward, considering for instance the range 75-100 instead of the range
50-75 - Panel A of Table 5 - and 85-110 - Panel B. We find in all cases, considering the three
main polynomials of union membership, coefficients that are always statistically insignificant
(and small and negative). We find these results as important additional evidence in support
of our causal interpretation of our main findings.
Finally, we also pursue a number of additional robustness checks (not presented but avail-
able upon request). The first one concerns the roles of employer association affiliation. Here
we consider extended versions of equation 1, in which we investigate if the effects of the union
rep mandates differ depending on the characteristics of firms along this dimension. In partic-
ular, we add an interaction between union rep mandates and employer association affiliation.
We find that the firm performance effects of union rep mandates are not affected by the status
of the firm with respect to employer association affiliation, even if the latter is associated to
significantly higher performance levels.
A second domain concerns differences in firm characteristics. We find that the results are
robust when splitting the sample in different ways, including by region and sectors. The only
exception is when considering exclusively older firms, namely those that were established at
least twenty years before the year when the firms are observed (2010). On the other hand,
we find that the union rep effects are strongest in manufacturing.
A third area of robustness concerns the range of firm sizes considered, in terms of our
running variable. We find that our main results are robust even when excluding a large
range of the left tail of the distribution of the running variable, between one to 35 union
members (e.g. considering only firms with 35 or more union members). This can address any
14
concerns that our firm performance results may be picking up differences in firm size, namely
the contrast in performance between very small and larger firms, despite previous findings
of robustness when controlling for firm size directly. We also find very similar results when
restricting our analysis to the 1-99 union members range and using a simple (single-threshold)
RD approach, with different types of polynomials.
5 Additional outcomes
Having established the positive effects on firm performance (as measured by sales per worker)
of the legal mandate towards additional union reps, we now turn our attention to comple-
mentary variables. Table 6 presents our findings from equation 1 when considering five new
outcomes, profits, exports, capital equity, workers, and firm survival, using a polynomial based
on a linear measure of the number of union members.
Panel A presents the results in the case of profits and exports. The former variable is
constructed as total annual sales minus the value of the annual gross wage bill (the average
wage times the number of workers times the number of salaries paid per year - 14 - times
one plus the social security payments due by firms -23.75%) minus a proxy for capital costs
(assumed to correspond to 5% of the firm’s capital equity). We then take the log of the ratio
of this proxy of annual profits by the number of workers. We find that, for the resulting
sub-sample of firms with positive profits, the effect of additional union reps is again positive
and large, at 0.235. These results strengthen the previous findings of positive effects on firm
performance.
Panel A also considers two measures of exports, first in terms of their extensive margin
(a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is exporting in 2010) and then in terms of the
intensive margin (about how much the firm exports, measured in log exports per worker). In
both cases we find statistically significant positive effects, of 0.081 in the case of the extensive
margin and of 0.46 in the case of exports per worker. These results indicate that union reps
can not only contribute positively towards overall firm performance but may also enhance
the international competitiveness of the firm, in the sense that it is able to start selling or to
increase sales to typically more demanding international markets.
Panel B of Table 6 finds equally positive and statistically significant effects on comple-
mentary variables such as capital equity, firm size (number of workers) and the probability
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that the firm remains in business over the following three years (2013 is the last year of the
QP data set that we currently have access to). The coefficients are, respectively, 0.213, 0.177
and 0.058 and are all significant at the 1% level except capital equity, which is only significant
at the 10% level.9 The positive effects on employment further support our main results on
firm performance (defined as sales per worker), as they indicate that the improvement in that
ratio is not coming about from a reduced value of the denominator (i.e. cuts in workforce size,
through dismissals of marginal and less productive workers). Quite on the contrary, increases
in the number of workers are to be expected in firms that become more productive, as the
value of additional workers is greater, especially if wages do not increase correspondingly. This
last point will be discussed below, when we examine the effects of union reps upon wages.
Finally, the last result, indicating positive effects of union reps on firm survival, is also
important given that the period over which it is measured (2011-2013) was characterised by a
large recession in Portugal (GDP fell by over 6% in cumulative terms over those three years) in
contrast to the main year of our study (2010), when the economy grew by 1.5%. This finding
suggests that union reps can also promote firm resilience during difficult times, possibly by
better conveying the challenges faced by the firm to the workforce and obtaining higher levels
of work intensity over those periods.
What specific channel of the intervention of union reps in firms may be driving the per-
formance effects documented above? As in all other research, we cannot test all areas that
have been suggested to be relevant in the delivery of effects of trade unions, such as collective
bargaining, training, health and safety, compliance with regulations, information dissemina-
tion, strikes, restructuring and dismissals, even if some suggestive evidence is already provided
by some of the robustness checks and extensions above. One additional channel we examine
concerns collective bargaining, taking into account the institutional context of Portugal, in
which sectoral bargaining is dominant (and typically applies to all firms in nearly all industries
through extension procedures), as discussed before. Specifically, we investigate if firms with
additional union reps are more likely to be under firm- or holding-level collective agreements,
in addition to (topping up) the ubiquitous sectoral agreements. However, we do not find any
significant effects of this (results not presented but available upon request), which can also be
explained by the very low number of firm-level agreements in the country. Indeed, our sample
9While capital equity will be correlated with capital investments, it is a crude proxy namely because it is
adjusted only seldom, which will explain both its large coefficient and standard error.
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covers nearly all of them and indicates that they are present in only 3% of firms.
We then turn our attention to investments in the human capital of the workforce, drawing
on firm-level information on the number of hours of worker training in 2010. As mentioned
above, this is not only an area valued by unions, which typically have a strong preference
towards gains in competitiveness through improvements in productivity than cuts in labour
costs. Training is also a domain that can be incentivised by the more compressed wage
distributions that follow from sectoral collective bargaining (Acemoglu & Pischke 1999). As
in the case of exports, we consider both extensive and intensive margins - if there is or not
training and increases in the quantity of training, respectively.
The results, presented in Table 7, indicate that the extensive margin is not affected by
union reps, possibly because firms are already required by law to invest a minimum number
of hours in the training of each worker: an average of 35 hours per year (over three years)
per full-time worker. On the other hand, we find that both the total amount of training per
firm and the amount of training per worker increase significantly in firms mandated to have a
high number of union reps. The coefficients in these cases are of 0.275 and 0.414, respectively.
These results indicate that mandates that increase the number of union reps in firms, can
indeed lead to stronger investments in training, which can then lead to higher levels of firm
performance. While we cannot measure training quality, we believe it is reasonable to expect
this to be positively correlated with training quantity.
These results are consistent with the effects of sectoral bargaining, earlier research (Dust-
mann & Schonberg 2009, Almeida & Carneiro 2009, Martins 2018) as well as with the focus
of many trade unions on investments in workers’ productivity through training, as mentioned
above. An additional interpretation is that training can correspond, to some extent, to a form
of rent sharing, both because training can increase the worker’s labour market opportunities
in other firms, be more enjoyable than working, and because some training providers hired by
firms are organisations owned by trade unions.
The last additional variable that we consider is one of the most important for unions
and their reps: wages. Unlike in our previous analyses, we examine the effect of union
reps both at the firm- and the worker-level, exploiting the richness of our matched data.
Moreover, we also create different measures of wages at the firm-level, in addition to the
average wage, in particular the median wage, a measure of low wages (the 25th percentile)
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and of wage inequality (the ratio between the 75th and the 25th percentiles).10 Panel A of
Table 8 presents our findings, again using the benchmark equation (1) and a linear polynomial
in the number of union members. We find, in all cases, no evidence of statistically significant
effects. Coefficients are small in general and standard errors are always higher than the
coefficients. We also conduct an individual-level analysis, drawing on the matched dimension
of ’Quadros de Pessoal’ and the over 800,000 workers employed by the 6,489 firms in our
sample. We consider the log of the hourly pay of the worker (including all four items of pay
available in the data, such as base pay, overtime pay, bonuses and other components, which
can be more responsive to rent sharing (Martins 2009b)). Panel B of Table 8 shows that,
again, we do not find evidence that union reps mandates increase the wages of workers across
firms, in contrast to the abundant evidence on firm-level performance.
While possibly paradoxical at first, this result can be explained by the dominant sectoral
structure of collective bargaining in Portugal, as in many other countries. In this context,
wage increases are driven largely by the changes in the minimum wages of different occupa-
tions and job levels following the introduction or the revision of a collective agreement and
their extensions within firms and across the industry (Martins 2014). Therefore, there is a
very limited scope for union wage differentials as they have been discussed in the cases of
countries with decentralised collective bargaining (Card 1996, Lanot & Walker 1998).11 More
importantly here, productivity increases following from firm-level developments (including
the mandates towards additional union reps examined in this paper) will presumably lead to
wage increases across all firms in the sector, given the nature of collective bargaining, and not
necessarily only those firms where the productivity increases have emerged. This would lead
to a disconnect between productivity and wages at the firm level and the absence of wage
differentiation that we document in our sample of firms, in contrast to our findings of firm
performance increases. This result may also explain, at least in part, why we observe higher
levels of employment in the firms subject to the mandate thresholds compared to those that
fall just short of them, as wages growth may exceed productivity growth in the latter group.
10Using the same data set as in this paper, Martins (2008) finds that within-firm pay inequality is significantly
associated to lower firm performance.
11Breda (2015) finds a positive even if very small union wage premium at the workplace level in France
in spite of the similar institutional context as Portugal in terms of widespread extensions. This premium in
France could be driven by the additional legal requirements in France regarding bargaining also at the firm
level.
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6 Conclusions
Employee representatives in firms are a potentially key element of the economic impact of
unions and works councils. Indeed, the actions of these individuals involve multiple worker-
related dimensions which are also potential drivers of firm performance. Depending on the
institutional context, these dimensions may include collective bargaining, health and safety
practices, restructuring, strikes, and training. However, the effect of employee representatives
has not yet been studied, in contrast to other research areas in economics where attention
has already been paid to the roles of the people behind the institutions, such as managers,
politicians, teachers or doctors.
Our causal examination of the impact of a major type of employee representatives, union
delegates, is based on the analysis of the mandated variation in their number in each firm. We
focus on the case of Portugal, where - similarly to other countries - the Labour Code establishes
union membership thresholds for union representation in firms: while firms employing between
one and 49 union members are required to have one union rep, this figure increases to two
(three) for firms with 50 to 99 (100-199) members. Drawing on rich matched employer-
employee data and regression discontinuity methods, we examine a sample of over 6,000 firms
that includes virtually all firms in the country that employ at least one unionised worker.
In our analysis of this novel intensive margin of unions, we find that a one percentage point
increase in the legal union rep/union members ratio leads to a significant increase in firm
performance (sales per worker), of at least 7%. This result also holds across a large number of
complementary dimensions of firm performance (including exports) and in several robustness
checks.
These are large marginal effects even if they may be regarded as lower bounds. Perhaps
paradoxically, these results may be explained by the relatively small number of reps and hours
off work per rep (five hours per month) that the law requires firms to recognise and support.
Given this low base, it is more understandable that the increase in the number of hours for
union activities that follows from an additional union rep can lead to a large relative effect
in the intensity of the interaction between workers and firm owners mediated by union reps
and thus also a large effect on firm performance. This interpretation also implies that one
would not necessarily expect similarly large effects from union reps in countries where reps
are already entitled to more generous provisions, either in terms of union rep numbers or in
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terms of time off work devoted to union activities per union rep.
We also find evidence that the positive effects on firm performance that we document
are driven by stronger investments by firms in the training of their workers, a result that is
consistent with the focus placed by most unions on the investment in the human capital of
their members and of workers in general. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that
other dimensions of union activities are also important. These would include more qualitative
aspects such as the type of industrial relations inside the firm, as workers’ voice is potentially
made more cohesive through the intermediation of union reps and the resulting dialogue with
employers can become more effective.
On the other hand, despite the significant effects on firm-level performance, we find no
effects of union reps on the wages of their co-workers. This result can be explained by the
institutional context considered here, which is characterised by sectoral-level collective bar-
gaining and widespread extensions of agreements to non-affiliated firms. In other words, while
the gains in productivity from (additional) union reps arise at the firms where they are based,
most of the wage bargaining (rent sharing) takes place at the sectoral level. The wage levels
of different firms in the same sector would therefore not necessarily be significantly different,
and would not respond to differences in union reps, even if some firms experienced stronger
increases in performance driven by union reps. The importance of wages defined at sectoral
agreements can also explain part of the large effects on training that we find, as rigid wages
can amount to a further incentive for firms to invest in training, magnifying the push in that
direction from union reps. Moreover, the heterogeneity in performance across firms combined
with the common wage levels can in turn lead to within-sector mismatches between productiv-
ity growth and wage growth. These potential mismatches are also consistent with our findings
about the positive effects of union reps on firm-level employment.
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Figure 1: Legal requirements on the number of union delegates by union members
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Source: Labour Code of Portugal (Article 463). Range of unionised workers considered between 10 and 800.
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Figure 2: Percentage of union delegates per union members and number of union members
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Source: Own calculations based on Labour Code of Portugal (Article 463). The range of unionised workers
considered between 10 and 800.
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Figure 3: Distribution of firms by number of union members
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Notes: The sample is all firms in Portugal employing at least ten workers and between one and 300 union
members, as measured in October 2010. Own calculations based on the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data set.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD
Workers 124.69 343.48
Union members 26.89 73.47
Additional union representative(s) 0.07 0.26
75 <= Firm-level union membership < 150 0.04 0.20
150 <= Firm-level union membership < 250 0.02 0.13
250 <= Firm-level union membership < 600 0.01 0.11
600 <= Firm-level union membership < 800 0.00 0.05
Log 2010 sales per worker 10.99 1.34
Manufacturing 0.32 0.46
Construction 0.06 0.24
Retail and wholesale 0.14 0.35
Transports and storage 0.05 0.23
Hotels and restaurants 0.07 0.25
Health and social support 0.09 0.29
Firm age: 10-19 years 0.24 0.43
Firm age: 20-49 years 0.43 0.49
Firm age: 50+ years 0.16 0.37
Foreign-owned firm 0.16 0.36
Aveiro district 0.09 0.29
Braga district 0.08 0.27
Porto district 0.30 0.46
Lisbon district 0.16 0.37
Setubal district 0.06 0.24
Incorporated firm 0.77 0.42
Training provided 0.64 0.48
Log training hours 6.59 1.86
Log training hours (+1) per worker 0.26 3.01
Exporter status 0.32 0.47
Log exports 12.98 3.26
Log exports per worker 8.61 3.05
Log equity per worker 8.69 2.03
Log average total pay per worker 6.81 0.46
Log 25th percentile total pay 6.49 0.43
Log median total pay 6.71 0.42
Ratio between 75th and 25th percentiles of total pay within each firm 1.67 1.49
Artificial additional union rep(s) (1) 0.05 0.21
Artificial additional union rep(s) (2) 0.03 0.18
Notes: 6,489 observations. ’Workers’ (’Union members’) are the numbers of workers (union members)
in each firm (October 2010); ’Additional union rep(s)’ is a dummy variable (dv) equal to one if the union
members number is just above the thresholds at which the law establishes that firms should have one (or
more) additional union reps (50-75, 100-150, 200-250, 500-600, 700-800, 900-1000); ’75 <= U. Membership
< 150’ is a dv equal to one for firms with membership ranges of 75 to 150 workers (similarly for the other
dv’s); ’Log sales per worker’ is the log of 2010 total sales divided by the number of workers; ’Firm age: 10-19
years’ is a dv equal to one for firms founded 10-19 years before 2010; ’Foreign-owned firm’ is a dv equal to
one for firms in which 50% of more of equity is owned by foreign investors; ’Aveiro district’ is a dv equal
to one for firms based in the Aveiro region; ’Training provided’ is a dv equal to one if at least one hour of
training is provided by the firm in 2010; ’Log training hours (+1) per worker’ is the log of 2010 training
hours (plus one) divided by the number of workers; ’Exporter status’ is a dv equal to one for firms that
export in 2010; ’Log average total pay per worker’ includes base pay plus other available items; ’Artificial
add. union rep(s) (1) and (2)’ are dv’s equal to one if for firms in which the number of union members is
25 or 50 workers above the legal thresholds (eg 75-100, 120-175, 250-300, 600-700, etc). Own calculations
based on the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’.
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Table 2: Firm performance effects: main specification
(1) (2) (3)
Additional unions rep(s) .157 .132 .140
(.063)∗∗ (.066)∗∗ (.067)∗∗
Union members -.00003 .001 .0005
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
(Union members)2 -.0002 .0001
(.0001) (.0003)
(Union members)3 -.003
(.003)
75 <= U. Membership < 150 .139 .084 .093
(.084)∗ (.095) (.096)
150 <= U. Membership < 250 .285 .197 .186
(.150)∗ (.166) (.165)
250 <= U. Membership < 600 .383 .335 .247
(.281) (.285) (.286)
600 <= U. Membership < 800 .155 .562 .499
(.586) (.623) (.632)
800 <= U. Membership < 1000 .607 1.417 1.667
(.756) (.902) (.953)∗
1000 <= U. Membership < 1200 .138 1.665 2.827
(.943) (1.342) (1.666)∗
Const. 10.961 10.950 10.954
(.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Obs. 6489 6489 6489
R2 .62 .62 .62
Notes: The columns present different specifications of a (sharp) regression discontinuity model. The depen-
dent variable is the log of 2010 sales per worker. The running variable (total number of unionised workers in
2010). The key regressor (’Additional union rep(s)’) is a dummy variable taking value one for firms employing
ranges of unionised workers just above the threshold established by labour law corresponding to one or more
additional union representatives: 50-75, 100-150, 200-250, 500-600, 700-800, 900-1000 and 1100-1200 unionised
workers. The sample is all firms in Portugal employing at least ten workers (unionised or not) and between
one and 1,200 unionised workers, as measured in October 2010. All specifications include 635 industry fixed
effects defined at the five-digit level. Own calculations based on the ‘Quadros de Pessoal’ data set. Robust
standard errors, with union membership clustering. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 3: Firm performance effects: alternative specification
(1) (2) (3)
50 <= U. Membership < 100 .175 .186 .192
(.063)∗∗∗ (.075)∗∗ (.075)∗∗
100 <= U. Membership < 200 .238 .256 .337
(.124)∗ (.141)∗ (.172)∗
200 <= U. Membership < 500 .358 .364 .605
(.209)∗ (.211)∗ (.327)∗
Union members .0002 -3.76e-06 .0008
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
(Union members)2 .00007 -.001
(.0003) (.001)
(Union members)3 .021
(.025)
Const. 10.953 10.955 10.950
(.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Obs. 6454 6454 6454
R2 .619 .619 .619
Notes: See notes to Table 2 for explanation of results. The main regressors are a list of range of unionised
workers at which the minimum number of union reps is increased: 50-100, 100-200, and 200-500.The sample
is all firms in Portugal employing at least ten workers (unionised or not) and between one and 1500 unionised
workers, as measured in October 2010. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 4: Firm performance effects: robustness checks
Panel A (controls) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Additional union rep(s) .158 .140 .160 .128
(.090)∗ (.065)∗∗ (.067)∗∗ (.062)∗∗
Union members .001 .0009 -.0001 -.0002
(.001) (.0009) (.0009) (.0008)
Const. 10.925 10.947 10.957 12.000
(.021)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.587)∗∗∗
No industry controls X
Two-digit industry controls X
Collective agreement FEs X
Firm-level controls X
Obs. 6489 6489 6489 6489
R2 .014 .496 .504 .639
Panel B (no range controls) (1) (2) (3)
Additional union rep(s) .146 .094 .088
(.048)∗∗∗ (.051)∗ (.053)∗
Union members .0007 .002 .002
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
(Union members)2 -.0002 -.0002
(.00005)∗∗∗ (.0002)
(Union members)3 .0006
(.001)
Const. 10.959 10.944 10.942
(.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Obs. 6489 6489 6489
R2 .619 .619 .619
Panel C (no clustering) (1) (2) (3)
Additional union rep(s) .157 .132 .140
(.064)∗∗ (.066)∗∗ (.067)∗∗
Union members -.00003 .001 .0005
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
(Union members)2 -.0002 .0001
(.0002) (.0004)
(Union members)3 -.003
(.003)
Const. 10.961 10.950 10.954
(.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Obs. 6489 6489 6489
R2 .62 .62 .62
Notes: See notes to Table 2 for explanation of results. Panel A includes either no industry controls (column
1) or different types of industry and or firm controls (two-digit industry controls, collective agrement fixed
effects, and a large set of firm-level controls - industry, region, firm legal type, firm age, and foreign ownership
status). Panel B excludes controls for union membership ranges. Panel C includes these controls (not reported)
but does not include any clustering of standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 5: Firm performance effects: falsification checks
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
False additional union rep(s) (1) -.025 -.031 -.031
(.078) (.078) (.078)
Union members .002 .002 .002
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗
(Union members)2 -.0001 -.0001
(.0001) (.0004)
(Union members)3 .00007
(.004)
Const. 10.945 10.940 10.940
(.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Obs. 6489 6489 6489
R2 .62 .62 .62
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
False additional union rep(s) (2) -.050 -.057 -.057
(.074) (.075) (.076)
Union members .002 .002 .002
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
(Union members)2 -.0001 -.0002
(.0001) (.0004)
(Union members)3 .0004
(.004)
Const. 10.945 10.940 10.940
(.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Obs. 6489 6489 6489
R2 .62 .62 .62
Notes: Panel A considers the falsified ’additional union rep(s)’ ranges at 75-100, 120-175, 250-300, 600-700,
800-900, and 1000-1100. Panel B considers the falsified ’additional union rep(s)’ ranges at 85-110, 130-185, 270-
325, 625-725, 825-925, and 1050-1150. The controls for union membership ranges are adjusted correspondingly.
See the notes to Table 2 for additional explanations of the results. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 6: Additional firm-level outcomes: equity, exports, and workers
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Log profits Export Log exports
per worker status per worker
Additional union rep(s) .235 .081 .460
(.076)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.249)∗
Union members -.0004 .001 -.001
(.001) (.0003)∗∗∗ (.004)
Const. 10.820 .281 8.506
(.018)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.080)∗∗∗
Obs. 5669 6713 2100
R2 .558 .524 .58
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
Log equity Log number Survival
per worker of workers by 2013
Additional union rep(s) .213 .177 .058
(.118)∗ (.067)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Union members -.001 .014 -9.00e-06
(.001) (.001)∗∗∗ (.0003)
Const. 8.659 3.643 .862
(.026)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Obs. 5748 6713 6713
R2 .446 .516 .138
Notes: The columns present different specifications of a (sharp) regression discontinuity model. The depen-
dent variables are . See the notes to Table 2 for additional explanation of the results. Significance levels: *
0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Table 7: Training effects: different margins
(1) (2) (3)
Training Log Log training
probability training per worker
Additional union rep(s) .046 .275 .414
(.028) (.137)∗∗ (.210)∗∗
Union members .002 .012 .005
(.0004)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)
Const. .596 6.202 .049
(.007)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.044)
Obs. 6713 4241 6713
R2 .226 .328 .226
Notes: The columns present different specifications of a (sharp) regression discontinuity model. The depen-
dent variables are the probability that the firm provided training in 2010, the log total training hours for all
workers, and the log training hours (plus one) per worker. See the notes to Table 2 for additional explanation
of the results. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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Table 8: Wage effects: firm- and worker-level analysis
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log average Log 25th Log median 75th/25th
pay perc pay pay perc ratio
Additional union rep(s) .016 .003 .007 -.061
(.021) (.024) (.021) (.088)
Union members .0007 .0003 .0005 .0007
(.0003)∗∗∗ (.0003) (.0003)∗ (.001)
Const. 6.782 6.480 6.689 1.675
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
Obs. 6709 6624 6698 6624
R2 .574 .474 .596 .11
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
Additional union rep(s) .0001 -.030 -.037
(.021) (.023) (.025)
Union members -.0001 .001 .001
(.0003) (.0004)∗∗ (.0005)∗∗
(Union members)2 -.0001 -.0002
(.00004)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗
(Union members)3 .0005
(.0008)
Const. 1.685 1.666 1.662
(.008)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Obs. 818204 818204 818204
R2 .39 .391 .391
Notes: The columns of Panel A (firm-level analysis) present different specifications of a (sharp) regression
discontinuity model. The dependent variables in Panel A are the log firm-level average total pay in October
2010, the log 25th percentile total pay, the log median total pay, and the ratio of the 75th and 25th percentiles
of total pay. Panel B presents the worker-level analysis, under different polynomials of the number of union
members and using the log of the hourly total monthly pay of each worker as the dependent variable in all
specifications. Significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
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